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On 15th July 2014 the BRICS Group members (Brazil, India, China, Russia 
and South Africa) signed agreements that established two new interna-
tional financial institutions, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the 
Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA).[1]  The NBD with an initial 
capital of US$100bn. has a brief to provide no-strings loans to Emerging 
Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs), principally for major infra-
structure and sustainable development projects. In addition, compared 
to the established international institutions the NDB is committed to pro-
viding loans more rapidly and more cheaply, and operate through more 
representative and democratic forms of governance and decision making. 
(see BRICS 2013, paragraph 9: BRICS 2014b). The NDB is complemented by 
the US$100bn. CRA, which is intended to provide assistance to countries 
with short-term liquidity problems (BRICS 2014b paragraph 13; BRICS 
2014c). It is expected that both institutions will begin lending in 2016. 
Since the establishment of the NDB and the CRA, two new regional 
financial bodies have also been agreed, both led by China. Firstly, the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with an initial capital of 
US100bn., was signed into existence by 21 Asia-Pacific economies on 
24 October 2014.[2]  Secondly, on 8 November the Silk Road Infrastruc-
ture Fund (SRIF) was announced, with an initial Chinese contribution 
of US$40bn. and the aim of promoting infrastructure and linkages 
within Central and Southern Asia (Carsten and Blanchard 2014). 
Behind all these new institutions lies a significant gap in the institu-
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tional and funding provision for EMDCs, 
not least in Asia, and related major dis-
satisfaction with the priorities, procedures, 
and governance of the ADB, IMF and World 
Bank, and the conditionalities they attach 
to loans. Despite this, the BRICS have been 
at pains to stress that the NDB and CRA are 
intended to complement rather than replace 
the established financial order, a point also 
stressed by China with respect to the AIIB 
and SRIF (BRICS 2014a paragraph 11; People’s 
Daily Online 2014). However, whether one 
accepts this or not, the founding of these 
new agencies must be seen as an implicit 
challenge to the established international 
financial system. A challenge that has to 
be evaluated in terms of the prospect of 
the new institutions being able to function 
effectively, expand their membership and 
develop lending capacity, and a series of 
other developments that are pressing on the 
international financial order and, indeed, 
the form of the global system as a whole.
While it can be argued that the pro-
posed initial financial capacities of the new 
institutions are limited compared to the IMF’s 
US$750bn. liquidity, the World Bank’s lend-
ing capacity of US$200bn.[3]  and ADB’s 
US$165bn.,[4]  it should be stressed that 
behind the NDB and CRA lie the foreign 
reserves of the BRICS (some US$5tr.), while in 
2013 the international lending of the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) was US$88bn.
[5]  and that of the Chinese Export Import 
Bank’s US$240bn.[6]  A more serious barrier 
to effective operation could be the disparate 
and often far from harmonious nature of the 
BRICS group (see for example Nye 2013). 
Undoubtedly, there are major differences 
(and lack of trust), which reduces the group’s 
effectiveness and necessitate often protracted 
negotiations. However, while the process 
of agreeing the NDB stretched over two 
years and revealed many serious differences 
between the BRICS that involved much com-
promise,[7]  the critical point is that agreement 
was reached, as it was with respect to the CRA 
and the many other initiatives that have come 
out of the BRICS summits (see below). That 
is, these countries do have some have signifi-
cant overlapping interests, and are capable of 
highly pragmatic decision-making (Xianoyum 
and Carey 2014). However, it must be stressed 
that the decision-making capacity and unity 
of the BRICS (and the members of the AIIB) 
are likely to be severely tested in setting up 
the new institutions. For quite apart from 
any opposition that they might experience 
from the old institutions and their principle 
backers (see below), the agreements that have 
been signed are far from detailed blueprints 
and much planning and negotiation remains 
to be done. Notably, with respect to the NDB 
and CRA, there are significant issues over the 
mechanism for extending the membership 
beyond the BRICS and the implications of this 
for institutional governance. The stated inten-
tion is for all members of the CRA and NDB 
to have an equal vote (with no provision for a 
veto), individual countries only able increase 
their contribution with the majority agreement 
of the others and limits to the extent to which 
one member can dominate the funding.[8]  
However, it is not clear how this will operate 
as membership expands, not least given the 
stipulation that expansion must not reduce the 
BRICS share of capital below 55% (EuroActi 
2014), and the extent to which financial 
resources are concentrated in Chinese hands. 
Though, it should be stressed that significant 
efforts have been made to offset the percep-
tion that China will dominate the institutions. 
For the NDB, while the headquarters of the 
will be in Shanghai, during the first five years 
the President will be an Indian, the Chairman 
of the Board of Governors Russian, the Chair-
man of the Board of Directors Brazilian, and 
the first regional centre of the Bank will be in 
South African (BRICS 2014 paragraph 12). Of 
course it can be argued that this move will 
prove to be little more than window dressing, 
with the interests of the BRICS in general and 
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China in particular coming to over-ride those 
of the other members.[9]  This could result in 
a lending regime that is no more developmen-
tal than those of the established institutions. A 
situation that could well produce tensions and 
discontents would undermine the effective-
ness and legitimacy of the new institutions. 
Thus, for all of the new institutions the lend-
ing regime and level of transparency, and how 
these are perceived, will be critical to success. 
Details of the lending procedures are 
as yet scant, while the assumption is that the 
new institutions will follow the lead of the 
NDB which has stressed that loans will be 
‘string free’, this leaves the intriguing question 
of what this means in practice. While all the 
BRICS statements have made it clear that the 
concern of the NDB will be with ‘projects not 
policies’ and there will be none of the interfer-
ence with domestic affairs or the ability of 
governments to formulate and implement 
policies that characterise lending by the IMF 
and World Bank, this does not mean that 
in other respects the loan conditions would 
be less onerous. For the NDB, particularly 
in its early stages, will have to prioritise 
high quality loans in order to maximise the 
development impact and minimise the risk of 
default. This is not least because it will affect 
the credit rating, the cost of NDB borrowing 
and the generation of profit levels necessary to 
support future lending (Griffith-Jones (2014: 
8). Such considerations could well seriously 
constrain lending, particularly to poorer coun-
tries and for more developmental projects, 
thus adding to the possibility for tensions 
and discontent amongst would-be borrow-
ers noted above. When this is combined with 
a commitment to process loans rapidly, in a 
less bureaucratic manner, while keeping the 
cost below that of the World Bank, which is 
able to borrow at exceptionally low rates,[10]  
much is going to be asked of the technical, 
administrative, managerial, diplomatic and 
public relations capacity of the NDB.[11]  
While the sheer scale of the task of 
setting up the new institutions from scratch 
should not be underestimated (The Econo-
mist 2014), nor should the discontent with 
the operation of governance of the IMF and 
World Bank, and the scale of gap in funding 
provision for the EMCDs. There are several 
interlinked issues here. Firstly, the failure to 
reform the global financial architecture, which 
has left the World Bank and, even more, the 
IMF dominated by Western interests. Thus, 
the BRICS (and the EMDCs as a whole) 
perceive themselves as having little input into 
policy formulation and implementation in 
these key institutions.[12]  A point made very 
clearly in the ‘Sixth BRICS Summit Fortaleza 
Declaration’ that followed the signing of the 
NDB agreement.[13]  Secondly, in the EMDCs 
the level of discontent with the lending prac-
tices and conditionalities of the World Bank 
and IMF are such that for many governments 
these are toxic brands that should be avoided 
at all costs (see comments below on South 
Korea). This reflects the whole history of SAPs 
(Structural Adjustment Programmes) and 
bailout programmes, with their imposition of 
austerity, budget cuts and neo-liberal agendas, 
increasingly accompanied by political, social 
and environmental requirements. While much 
in the neoliberal agenda has long been criti-
cised, since 2007 it has become significantly 
discredited. This not least because of the 
failure of Western countries to adhere to the 
advice give so freely to the EMDCs, for exam-
ple with respect to debt and fiscal deficits, and 
the manner in which the post-2007 crisis was 
rooted in forms of regulation, practice and 
innovation in the Western financial sectors, 
that the EMDCs and been told to emulate. 
Thus, increasing numbers of countries have 
been reluctant to accept either the condition-
alities or the advice of the World Bank and, 
even more, the IMF. In addition, there is wide-
spread belief that countries are excluded from 
funding on ideological or political grounds at 
the behest of, in particular, the USA. Thirdly, 
even if countries are eligible for loans and pre-
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pared to accept the conditions, there is simply 
not enough funding available. The shortage is 
particularly acute for infrastructure projects, 
with an estimated annual shortfall of some 
US$1tri.,[14]  though ADB has suggested 
that for Asia-Pacific alone there is a need for 
US$8tr. of such investment by 2020 (Page 
2014: 10). The inability of the World Bank and 
its regional subsidiaries to provide the neces-
sary infrastructure investment for EMDCs has 
led to increased reliance by governments on 
foreign private sector sources, increasingly 
utilizing comparatively high cost variations 
on PPP. Indeed, the view that infrastruc-
ture funding is now the province of private 
investors seems to have permeated both the 
major Western donors, as underlined at the 
November 2014 G20 Summit (Elliot 2014), 
and the international agencies which have 
promoted the establishment of institutions 
to channel such investment, as in the case 
of African Development Bank’s Africa50.
[15]  However, despite such initiatives, and 
the level of need, private sector funding 
has become less available for infrastructure 
projects in the EMDCs (Griffith-Jones 2014: 6). 
The shortage of funds for infrastruc-
ture projects poses particular problems for 
the BRICS. In Brazil and Russia growth 
continues to be being driven by resource 
exports, with consequent need for heavy 
infrastructure investment, while China and 
India are increasingly depended on imported 
resources and the ability of, in particular, 
other EMDCs to construct the facilities neces-
sary to maintain and expand output. It could 
of course be argued that China, and, to a 
lesser extent, India, could achieve much of 
their need to secure resource supplies and 
markets in developing economies through 
bilateral lending. However, channelling the 
funding through multilateral agencies enables 
risk to be pooled, limits reputational costs, 
and increases the perceived legitimacy.
Thus, it can be argued that new insti-
tutions with a strong emphasis on funding 
infrastructure for EMDCs and a differ-
ent approach to lending and institutional 
governance would fill a major gap in the 
international financial architecture. A strong 
argument can also be made with respect to 
short-term liquidity funding and the impor-
tance of the CRA as an alternative to the IMF 
(Griffith-Jones 2014: 2). Here, however, the 
issue is not so much a shortage of funds, but 
rather the extreme reluctance of very many 
countries to submit to the Fund’s condition-
alities noted above. This reluctance is well 
illustrated by the response of the governments 
of Indonesia and South Korea to the liquid-
ity crises that they experienced during the 
latter part of 2008. Crises that resulted from 
the rapid liquidising of assets in emergent 
markets that created a major shortage of US 
dollars (Sussangkarn 2010a: 13). Neither the 
Indonesian nor South Korean governments 
were prepared to apply to the IMF for assist-
ance. Indeed, in the case of South Korea, it 
was believed that the strength of popular 
feeling against the IMF was such that the 
government could not survive an approach to 
the Fund (Kawai 2009: 8; Sussangkan 2010b). 
In the event, South Korea was assisted by the 
Federal Reserve, a reflection of its continuing 
key role in the USA security strategy in East 
Asia. In contrast, the Fed refused funding 
to Indonesia which was viewed less favour-
ably by the USA, not least because of what 
was regarded as less than wholesale support 
for the American-led Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) and related actions in Afghanistan 
and the Middle East. Significantly, Indone-
sia was able to obtain the necessary funds 
through currency swaps with the Bank of 
China and the Bank of Japan, which served 
to focus attention on the development of 
such arrangements and related regional 
institutional structures noted below (Dixon 
2010: 5). More broadly, the experience of the 
EMDCs since 2007, and the ongoing instabil-
ity of the global economy, have continued to 
focuses attention of policy makers in these 
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countries on the need for alternative funding 
sources that are in tune with their require-
ments, and effective and less-Western-centred 
forms of international financial regulation.
[16]  In the absence of these, a major crisis, 
perhaps sparked by the complete unwind-
ing of the USA’s Quantitative Easing (QE) 
programme and subsequent interest rate rises, 
could force many countries to resort to World 
Bank and IMF funding, with all the attached 
unpalatable, if not unsound, policy strings. 
It could be that the establishment, and 
even more, the successful operation of the 
new institutions will act as the necessary 
catalyst for reform of the IMF, World Bank and 
broader international financial architecture 
(Griffiths-Jones 2014: 15). However, given 
the lack of progress to date and the refusal 
of the US Congress to ratify the 2010 agree-
ment on IMF reform, it is doubtful whether 
changes sufficient to address the demands of 
the EMDC’s are likely to take place rapidly. 
Rather, the concern is that there will be sig-
nificant opposition and / or counter moves 
by the old institutions and their backers, 
particularly the USA. Though, at the time 
of writing these has not gone beyond the 
USA attempting (unsuccessfully) to limit the 
number of countries signing the AIIB agree-
ment (Page 2014: 11), Japan proposing a major 
expansion of its infrastructure investment in 
ASEAN (Asahi Shimbun 2014) [17]  and ADB 
announcing a significant increase in lend-
ing capacity.[18]  In addition, the moves by 
the USA and Japan, which are the dominant 
powers within ADB,[19]  are perhaps more a 
reflection of concerns over AIID becoming a 
vehicle for China to increase its already con-
siderable regional role, rather than the threat 
that the new institution poses to the ADB per 
se.[20]  As such, the initial response to the AIIB 
should be seen as very much part of the USA’s 
‘pivot to Asia’ policy, which aims to lock coun-
tries into US-dominated investment, trade, 
currency and security structures through a 
proliferation of bi-lateral agreements and 
the overarching Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), from which China is excluded.
Perhaps more surprising than the limited 
initial response of the USA to the new 
institutions was that the NDB was actually 
welcomed by the President of the World Bank 
(Jim Yong Kim) as providing much needed 
additional funding, with an offer to provide 
technical assistance (Live Mint 2014). How-
ever, it is unclear what attitude the World 
Bank would take if the NDB lending does, 
as appears to be the intention, depart sig-
nificantly from World Bank lending norms. 
Similarly, the Director of the IMF (Christine 
Lagarde) congratulated the BRICS on the 
CRA and stated that the Fund would like to 
work with it (Soto 2014). However, this is 
perhaps not surprising given that the IMF has 
previously stated a willingness to endorse 
new funding institutions, but only as long as 
they are subject to the Fund’s scrutiny (Dixon 
2012: 3).[21]  Thus, both the NDB and CRA 
could come to face significant opposition 
from the World Bank, IMF and their princi-
ple supporters. Amongst the latter, it would 
be surprising if the USA did not become an 
outspoken critic if, as again seems likely, the 
new institutions begin to lend to regimes 
that it does not approve of, particularly 
given existing concerns over Chinese, and to 
a lesser extent Indian, investment activities 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. More broadly, there 
is likely to be some general opposition to 
the BRICS initiative from commercial and 
bilateral agencies. Thus, many of the EMDCs 
could find themselves under political pressure 
not to participate in the new institutions. 
While it is clear that any opposition to 
the new institutions has to be understood 
in terms of concerns over the rising powers, 
particularly China, the challenge implicit 
in the founding of the AIID, NDA and CRA 
must also be seen in the context of other 
developments that, while also at an early 
stage, similarly reflect discontent with the 
Western dominated international financial 
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architecture centering on the World Bank, 
the IMF and the use of the US$. Of particular 
significance is the proliferation of large-scale 
currency swaps between central banks – in 
which China is playing a very major role. 
Such arrangements are intended to provide 
short-term liquidity assistance that would 
more commonly be either obtained from 
the IMF or, for some favoured countries, 
the Federal Reserve. In East Asia a network 
of such swaps has been consolidated into a 
multilateral fund, the CMIM (Chiang Mai 
Initiative Mutilateralisation) launched in 2010, 
that some see as a step towards the forma-
tion of an Asian Monetary Fund that could 
directly challenge the position of the IMF in 
Asia.[22]  While behind the CRA proposal 
there are already formal moves to coordinate 
economic monitoring and macroeconomic 
policy, notably with respect to currencies 
(BRICS 2014, paragraph 13). This is the type of 
exchange of information, financial monitoring 
and policy coordination that is rapidly devel-
oping in East Asia under the CMIM.[23] For 
the BRICS the initial focus of such activity on 
currencies has been driven by depreciations 
against the US$, concerns over the impact 
of the end of QE in the United States, and 
ongoing discontent with the global role of the 
US$ (Griffiths-Jones 2014: 3; see also below). 
At the conclusion of the sixth BRICS 
Summit there was a strongly worded reitera-
tion of discontents over the development a 
number of other finance related initiatives, 
notably the Inter-Bank Cooperation Agree-
ment (to promote central bank cooperation), 
the Exchange Alliance (as a challenge to 
Western derivatives markets) and the 
Energy Exchange (as a challenge to the Inter-
Continental Exchange; see Cambell 2014). 
The Sixth BRICS Summit also reiterated 
discontents over the continued domination 
of the US$ and the ‘exorbitant privilege’ that 
the USA derives from this (Cambell 2014). 
While no new initiatives came from this, 
there are signs of a number of challenges 
to the position of the US$. This centres on 
shifts towards the use of the Euro, Renminbi 
and local currencies in both settlements and 
pricing of key commodities (Dixon (2014). 
While these shifts remain limited, this could 
change rapidly given the proliferation of 
bi-lateral agreements that enable the use of 
alternatives to the US$. Particularly notable 
are the agreements between China and Japan, 
China and Russia, and Argentina and Brazil. 
In addition, there are early stage discussions 
of the development of regional currency 
regimes in East Asia and Latin America.
All the above developments can be seen 
as reflecting moves towards the establishment 
of an alternative international financial order, 
particularly when seen in the context of the 
serious damage, dislocation and loss of cred-
ibility that the established system has incurred 
since 2007 and related acceleration of the shifts 
in the global distribution of economic and 
political power that were already evident well 
before the crisis. However, it could be that 
under present global conditions and the vari-
ous problems faced by the BRICs (notably the 
slowing of growth in China, persistent infla-
tion in Brazil and the impact on the Russian 
economy of the fall in oil prices and Western 
sanctions), the shifts in the global balance of 
economic power may significantly slow, while 
undermining the development of any alterna-
tive order and, in particular, stalling the NDB 
and CRA initiatives. Such a scenario would 
reduce the immediate challenge to the existing 
financial order, but would do little to reduce 
the discontent of the BRICS or the EMDCs 
as whole. Though it should be stressed that 
whatever the continuing strength of the chal-
lenge, it would seem unlikely (in the absence 
of some major event) that there will be in 
any abrupt shift in the international financial 
system. This a reflection of both the extent of 
the embedding of the established order and, 
despite the discontents of the EMDCs over its 
operation, the manner in which it has pro-
vided many of them, not least the BRICS, with 
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enormous (and continuing) benefits. Thus, the 
BRICS have no interest in moves that would 
destabilise the existing international financial 
order, so the emergence of alternatives and 
challenges are likely to be gradual. However, 
much will depend on the reaction of the 
established order. Some long-overdue accom-
modation to the reality of the global system 
could see a comparatively smooth transition 
to a more diverse, inclusive and responsible 
system. If this does not happen, the BRICS 
and the other major emerging economies may 
be expected to become more assertive. Which 
may well lead to a far less unified and perhaps 
less stable international financial system. 
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Notes
[1] This was the first day of the sixth BRICS 
summit in Fortaleza, Brazil (see BRICS 
2014a paragraphs 11 and 12). The NDB 
and CRA had been agreed in principle 
at the Fifth BRICS Summit held in Dur-
ban, South Africa (see BRICS 2013a).
[2] This was originally proposed in 
October 2013 and had been under seri-
ous discussion since May 2014. 
[3] In 2014 the World Bank announced that 
it was increasing its lending capacity to 
US$300bn., and raising annual lending from 
US$15bn. to US$25bn. (World Bank (2014).
[4] This gives an annual lending capacity 
of US$10-11bn.
[5] While the BNDES has been generally 
extremely successful there are concerns that its 
landing capacity could be reduced because of 
budgetary issues in Brazil (see Trevisani 2015).
[6] Griffith-Jones (2014: 1, 9-14) has stressed 
that the EMCDs, led by the BRICS, repre-
sent 25% of global GDP and have savings 
rates, reserves and investment funds that 
are more than equal to funding the NDB.
[7] For some comments on the issues 
that delayed the NBD agreement see 
EurActiv (2014). 
[8] In the NDB each of the five initial 
members holds 20% of the capital, while 
for the CRA the contributions are: China 
US$41; South Africa US5bn.; and Brazil,
India and Russia US$18bn. each.
[9] Concerns that are given some credence 
by the many commentators that see, in 
particular, Chinese loans to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as reflecting narrow economic inter-
ests – though such views tend to ignore 
the extent to which most Development 
Assistance (DA) can be similarly criti-
cised (see for example Bräutigam 2010).
[10] The World Bank is rated AAA, in con-
trast China is AA and the other BRICS BBB.
 
[11] This would be event more the case 
with respect to the CRA, for in evaluating 
requests for loans to cover liquidity short-
ages, it would be necessary to undertake 
some detailed and wide ranging examina-
tion of macroeconomic conditions and 
prospects, as well as government policies. 
 
[12] For an analysis of the extent to which 
this has been the driving force behind the 
establishment of the new institutions see 
SáGuimarães (2014).
[13] ‘We remain disappointed and seriously 
concerned with the current non-implementa-
tion of the 2010 International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) reforms, which negatively impacts 
on the IMF’s legitimacy, credibility and 
effectiveness’ (BRICS 2014c paragraph 18).
[14] See: Bhattachary and Romani (2013);
Bhattacharya, Romani and Stern (2012);
Griffith-Jones (2014: 2, 5-6).
[15] This aims to provide a $3bn. infra-
structure fund drawn from pension funds, 
insurance groups, sovereign wealth funds 
and institutional investors (see Blas 2014).
[16] These concerns were made very clear
in the ‘Sixth BRICS Summit Fortaleza Dec-
laration’ - see for example paragraphs 18 
and 19 (BRICS 2014c).
[17] This will triple Japan’s infrastructure 
investment in ASEAN to US$260bn. by 2020. 
A major vehicle for this expansion will be the 
Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment 
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Corporation for Transport and Urban Devel-
opment, which was established in October 
2014 with a capital of US$110bn. contributed 
by both the public and private sectors. 
[18] The capital of ADB to be increased from 
US$33bn. to US£50bn. and annual lend-
ing capacity from US$12bn. to US$15bn.
[19] Japan and the USA have respectively 
15.7% and 15.6% of the votes, while China 
has 6.4%, India 6.4% and Australia 5.8%. 
It is reported that China considers that its 
ADB vote share does not reflect its interna-
tional role – the same view that it takes of 
its position in the World Bank (Lee 2014).
[20] In this context a critical issue is 
the already large, and very rapidly 
expanding Chinese investment in 
infrastructure within Asia as a whole 
(Ashi Simbum 2014; Page 2014).
[21] This dates from a sharp change 
in IMF policy during 2000 in the 
direction of openly supporting the 
establishment of formal regional mon-
etary funds, but only as long as they
did not compete with the Fund (see Bird 
and Rajan 2002: 39; Kohler 2001; Park 2001:
6). For the IMF the bottom line was, in 
the event of any application for 
financial assistance, a regional fund 
would defer to the IMF which would 
direct any macroeconomic policy 
that it deemed necessary.
[22] This fund, which covers the ASEAN+3 
group of economies, has been expanded from 
an initial US$90bn. to US$500bn. For an 
account of the CMIM see: Dixon (2011);
Grimes (2011).
[23] A series of monitoring and coordinat-
ing bodies have been established, most 
significantly, AMRO (ASEAN+3 Macroeco-
nomic Research Organisation), which has a 
permanent secretariat based in Singapore.
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